grew clearly from an established tradition of consequentialist thinking and the context and influences on Bentham's own utilitarian brand of economic analysis will be identified. Third, the question of leniency in punishment is intrinsically connected to Bentham's analysis of the nature of offences and this focus for his theory will be examined, and significant distinctions illustrated between the consequentialist theories of Bentham and Beccaria. Finally, Bentham's analysis involved a sophisticated notion of 'economy' that allowed his calculative model to accommodate an account of the 'disposition' of an offender in the assigning of pain of punishment. This previously undiscussed element of his theory will be explored in some detail, and will be used to answer some significant criticisms of Bentham's 'economic' approach to punishment. 3 These four themes combine to form a consistent focus on Bentham's primary concern, that a reduction in the levels of pain applied was not only required, but was essential, if improved efficiency in the deterrent force of punishment, and hence an advance in political economy, was to be achieved by judicial practice. 
Political Economy and the 'Economic' Conception of Punishment
Consequentialist logic lies at the heart of Bentham's economic analysis of crime and punishment. Such methodology presents any act, and any legislative act in particular, as being 'right' in so far as it provides, or promises to provide, a surfeit of happiness.
Such 'happiness' can be understood either in conventional 'economic' terms as a monetary value, and this is appropriate for Bentham in many of his writings which considered specific financial issues. But, in relation to punishment, Bentham's discussion interprets 'economic' much more widely in his discussions of 'quantities' of pain and pleasure. For example, Bentham used very broad terms, such as 'mischief' for negatives in the cost-benefit equation -which covered everything from financial loss to fear and danger offered by the threat of offending. These general expressions allowed him to extend and apply his calculative analysis across a strikingly 4 Evidence from the Bentham archive at University College London will be of importance here. For Bentham's interest in leniency see UC xxvii. 48; for a discussion on precise calculation as an aid to deterrence see UC xxvii. 24a; and on the need for judicial interpretation see UC cxl. 61. broad range of economic, social and political issues. So, whilst monetary value was frequently the explicit concern of his thinking, it is constantly apparent that via his reductionist principles the ultimate measure underpinning his 'economic' perspective of social and political questions always remained pain and pleasure in the broadest sense.
For Bentham, social, political and economic perspectives were inextricably linked, and the symbiotic inevitability of subject approaches is clearly identified in his conception of the close relationship between penal theory and political economy. which create the species of offences which have been called offences against population, and offences against the national wealth.
8
This view links the pursuit of national 'wealth' with his discussion of offences in chapter sixteen of IPML, and a case is made for all issues of political economy to be regarded as dependent on the security provided by the penal system.
Relying ultimately on the notion that security is the key to progress for national industry Bentham regarded the deterrent and reformative goal of punishment as essential to any co-ordination of economic growth undertaken by central authorities.
Accordingly, the provision of a deterrent system of punishment was intrinsically linked, in Bentham's view, to a calculative emphasis on the nature of both individual motivation and the central questions of political economy.
Quantification was key to both his general and specific pictures of deterrence and the motivation to offend. With this economically inclined focus at the core of
Bentham's penal theory, the constant source of his interest in terms of achieving an effective penal theory centres on the role of 'quantities' of legal pain applied in response to the harm done and benefit gained by an offence. The question of proportionality in the amount of pain inflicted as legal punishment is, therefore, fundamental to Bentham's penal theory and essential to his consideration of political economy.
Bentham's analysis of proportionality is comprehensive and seeks to identify not only when it is right to punish offending behaviour, but also at what level any penal intervention should take. His detailed analysis of the notional link between the harms and benefits of crime, the harms and benefits of punishment, and an explanation of how this 'economic analysis' was to operate when applied to questions of social policy embodies the foundational critique that so inspired Becker. By examining Bentham's discussion of proportionality as presented in IPML it is clear that Bentham was even more radical than Becker supposed. Bentham was perfectly able to understand how crime 9 could be effectively subjected to economic analysis, and he developed a radical vision of the choices made by offenders, or 'criminals', as being valid from their own perspective, and necessarily accounted for, even justified, by their own unique set of circumstances and sensibilities. 8 
Ibid.
9 'Crime' meaning all offending behaviour prescribed by law.
Bentham's account identified, more clearly than ever before, that crime is beneficial as well as harmful, and that legal punishment is harmful as well as beneficial. The core conceptions of costs and benefits expressed within his economic conception of crime and punishment can be represented, in simplified form, as follows:
Crime and Punishment Cost-Benefit From Bentham's description of political economy and his economic approach to punishment it can be seen that benefit 2a, that of general deterrence, must take precedence from the policy perspective since this promises greatest advantage for society at large. Yet the impact of policy on the individual is essential to Bentham's approach, and could never be over-ridden by his interest in, and requirement for, general deterrence. In this sense benefit 1 b, that of protecting 'non-offenders' from the danger of suffering punishment, was a key requirement, for this benefit adds materially to the sense of security required for progress in political economy, and it must act alongside any relief of 1a, the threat of becoming a victim of crime. Benefit 1a, shows how far Bentham went with his reductive consequentialism, since here illegal gains are identified as benefits -they may act against good political economy, but they are still goods for the individuals receiving them and will continue to occur so long as the future benefits of offending 'appear' to outweigh the threat of future pain.
Delicate balancing is therefore required in the assignment of pain of punishment, which is an evil, as a response to offending behaviour. Punishment is, then, a cost operating as a political tool, assisting in the process of selective restraint (it is simply not economically 'worth' trying to prevent all crime -this is clearly understood by
Bentham's ends of punishment.
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The problem for Bentham is how to secure the promotion of benefits 2a, 1 a and 2b without the harms imposed by the penal threat becoming excessive in terms of the implications for individuals? This concern for excess illustrates the emphasis placed on restraint in the application of legal pain, and provides a foundation for 'lenience' in punishment on an economic model. Lenience is a term frequently discussed by penal theorists of the late eighteenth century, but the term 'leniency' carried the wrong connotations for Bentham, since if the correct proportions are applied then the pain of punishment will be neither too lenient nor too severe, but 'just'. Proportionality is the key notion.
Proportionality had always been, of course, a core component of European penal theory and the idea that punishment embodied a 'just' desert for a crime committed had long been linked to the conception of a controlled and fair response to offending. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this notion of an optimal balance in the public response to crime took centre stage for the which their ideas developed.
The Background to Bentham on Proportion
Bentham's development of the idea of proportion between crimes and punishments shows considerable reliance and interaction with the work of earlier thinkers. In some respects he can be described as imposing an order on concepts previously introduced by Montesquieu and Beccaria -and also, to a degree, by Hobbes.
Bentham provided thirteen 'rules or canons' for penal proportion. 11 He did so with the intention of ensuring, as John Rawls has said, that 'the absolute level of penalties will be as low as possible'. 12 The result of Bentham's analysis was an intricate model calculating social pains against social pleasures, and aiming to provide graduations from mild to more severe punishment for the purpose of deterrence. In other words, his theory presents his penal sanction as an extension of, and in complete accord with, a system of political economy envisaged as efficient in that it would only ever deliver the minimum pain of punishment necessary to achieve reductions in offending behaviour.
a) Precursors to a Consequentialist Theory of Proportion
Though Bentham judged his own work to be original in the provision of a coherent structure for the assessment of quantities of pain as punishment he freely admitted debts to a number of thinkers, with key figures as far as punishment is concerned being Montesquieu, 13 21 in the depiction of legal action as a force of potential pain working against the opposite impelling forces of potential pleasure, the same conclusion was reached by both thinkers -that a certain quantity of punishment could be defined as both necessary and correct. The parallels with
Bentham's theory are strong in that the idea of proportion is crucial to both justifications of calibrated pain as 'punishment', and the argument was accordingly directed towards an 'economic' discussion of quantities of pain rather than concentrating on the more traditional debate regarding the appropriateness of specific forms of punishment.
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Other thinkers also showed that proportionality was a subject discussed in 
The Thirteen Rules of Proportion and the Production of Milder Punishment
The development of specific rules for the purpose of proportioning punishments to offences is clearly Bentham's most obvious contribution to proportion theory and the devising of optimal policy in the response to crime. With nine of his rules he established the foundations for increases in amounts of pain provided as punishment. 26 Three others protected against excesses, with rules five and six limiting increases in pain, whilst rule twelve provided for a positive diminution. Finally, a thirteenth rule was offered which stressed that precise calculation was not required and small disproportions might be ignored. With this plan Bentham sought the formation of a mechanism for a calibrated assessment and application of pain that was simply unknown to earlier analyses.
The crux of the theory was an overwhelming emphasis placed on quantities of pain: [...] the four first, we may perceive, serve to mark out the limits on the side of diminution: the limits below which a punishment ought not to be diminished: the fifth, the limits on the side of increase: the limits above which it ought not to be increased.
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Not only was this fifth rule, which limited the increase, of profound importance in
Bentham's scheme for the reduction of punishments as observed in contemporary legal practice, but each of the first four rules added quantities of pain in such a way as constantly to preserve their increase relative to the perceived increase in the 25 Francis Hutcheson maintained that 'right' action depended solely on material consequences, saying, 'That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers: and that worst, which in like manner, occasions misery'. And although in an early manuscript Bentham outlined a distinction which suggested that poor men might be driven by 'the physical appetite of hunger' rather than by 'the appetite for riches', he still regarded such poor men as selecting courses of action on the blunt basis of profit and loss, though he emphasised that they may be 'less qualified for the task'. 33 With such an understanding of the intrinsic nature of calculative, rational motivation, a system which itself emphasised calculation was not only suitable but, indeed, necessary. Consequently, Bentham formed a system in which more moderate punishments were deemed necessary on the basis of an application of logic rather than upon any sentimental or religious grounds. Appropriate quantities of pain, delivered by various punishments, were sought via an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of past punishments. The consequences of existing punishments were searched for their proven deterrent value, and a sense of mathematical precision was stressed throughout. 
a) Leniency as Bentham 's Fourth Objective of Punishment
At every point during his discussion of proportion Bentham kept his attention on the prime goal of deterrence, as expressed in his objects of punishment, but here too we find an important and insufficiently analysed element. 35 The first three of his objects have often been discussed in previous commentaries, and of greatest importance for
Bentham was the attempted prevention of all crimes -the first object of punishment.
He also made it clear, as his second object, that if an offence was to be committed then the penal code must seek to prevent the worst; and thirdly, such a code ought to dispose the offender to keep the mischief caused down to a minimum. But of particular interest here is the fourth object of punishment, which stated that mischief must be prevented 'at the least expence', and the influence of Beccaria is profound, as Becker rightly noted.
Whilst it is possible to view this object in monetary terms, and this view is certainly encouraged by Bentham's use of the term 'cheap', it also provides a clear reference to his broader economic model for crime prevention. In this respect 'cheapness' meant nothing more than the 'least quantity of pain' possible, or in other words, as mild a punishment as possible. Thus, whilst the first three objects of punishment concentrated on prevention, his fourth object of punishment was leniency, assessed as minimum pain or indisposition to severity. Leniency was, therefore, one of four key goals for
Bentham. And these four goals governed, collectively, the application of his rules of proportion:
Subservient to these four objects, or purposes, must be the rules or canons by which the proportion of punishments to offences is to be governed.
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In accord with his objects, Bentham's first four rules established additions in pain to outweigh the profit of the offence, to move against the greatest offences, to encourage preferment of the lesser of two competing offences, and to assign additions of punishment for each particle of mischief found to have been spread. Where Bentham made substantial developments in the understanding of proportion as a provider of leniency was with the fifth and sixth rules which, for the first time, established a limit to increases in pain. Whilst it was vital, as the fourth rule said, to 'punish for each particle of the mischief', the novel restraint on Bentham's infliction of pain was given by the emphasis in his fifth rule, that prevention be secured with minimum pain. Thus, stressing the importance of his objective of leniency, 
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The centrality of circumstances and sensibility were vital to Bentham's theory if he was to achieve the same end as Beccaria of protecting the individual within a logical system involving the assignment of pain. In practice Bentham indicated that this must involve delegating a considerable sphere of action to the judge. For, whilst his first five rules were intended to guide the legislator alone, with the sixth rule he attempted, quite specifically, to guide the judge, 'in his endeavours to conform, on both sides, to the intentions of the legislator'. 43 And the intentions of the legislator, as prescribed within the first five rules, were to inflict the mildest possible punishments which prevented mischief. Such concessions in favour of judicial interpretation stood in stark contrast to Beccaria's desire to avoid any leeway for 41 Ibid., p. 169. He emphasised the importance of the fifth rule later when discussing the properties to be given to punishment, 'the punishment ought in no case to be more than what is required by the several other rules: since, if it be, all that is above that quantity is needless'. Ibid., p. 175. 42 Ibid., p. 169. 43 Ibid.
judicial discretion. 44 Yet Bentham's inclusion of such discretion was essential to achieve the necessary scope to establish an economic, 'minimum' punishment as the standard.
b) The Calculation of Milder Punishment as an Aid to Deterrence
So far emphasis has been placed on the fourth object of delivering punishment at as cheap a rate as possible. In this sense minimum punishment was a key goal.
However, this fourth object did not detract from, but supported, the first three objects which together aimed for prevention. 45 Once again, debts were incurred here to both Beccaria and Eden. Beccaria, in particular, relied principally on arguments concerning certainty to support his position, and to remove the need for pardons or exemptions. So he wrote, '[...] one of the greatest checks on crime is not the cruelty of punishments, but their inevitability'. 46 Importance was clearly placed on the sureness of the infliction of punishment on the guilty. William Eden argued similarly, but added that mildness in punishing protected the public virtue of all -victims, witnesses, juries and judges. 47 This emphasis on mildness was a development from the notion prominent in Montesquieu and Beccaria that harsh punishments corrupted the citizenry, and that once a citizen body was accustomed to severe punishments such severity no longer shocked them into obedience of the law. 48 The most damaging criticism of the deterrent power of severe punishment was provided by Beccaria when he noted how extremely difficult it was to maintain 'the essential proportion' between offences and punishments when severity was high, and that impunity arose from the very savagery of severe punishments. Bentham, they simply had discretion to adjust the quantities of pain applied; yet this discretion was intended to allow better proportioning of punishment to offence, and hence improve the quality of the punishment as a deterrent for others. His objective of graduated, minimum pain therefore allowed, first, no reason for the restraint of prosecution on the part of both victim and jury, and second, the certain application of punishment, on the part of the judge.
The superiority of Bentham's system in its deterrent effectiveness relied completely on the accuracy of its calculative analysis of the quantity of punishment relative to the offence. As a standard rule Bentham held with the general dictum that 'the quantum of the punishment must rise with the profit of the offence'. 51 However, determining the profit of the offence was by no means straightforward although, 'the profit of the offence is commonly more certain than the punishment'. If the rules of evidence be clear from over-scrupulous subtleties, if the system of procedure be simple, and the administration of Justice pure, a small quantity of punishment is enough to make up that deficiency of force which results from the uncertainty of execution.
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The point to note is that only a small quantity of additional pain was envisaged within the supplements to punishment provided by rules seven, eight and nine above. The implication is, that the additions from these rules, for unknown elements in the calculation of punishment, are to be substantially less than the quantities of pain justified by the first and most important rule.
Yet, though the manuscript in question gives some clarification on this issue of supplementary pains, it raises new problems not treated in IPML. Whilst it seems to 54 Ibid. This suggestion provided material for those who suggested that Bentham continued to favour severe punishments: see Radzinowicz, English Criminal Law, p. 391. 55 Here Bentham seems to revert to giving undue weight to the manner of the offence, rather than the manner of the motives. 56 UC xxvii. 63. Sheet headed 'Common Measure', uncertainly dated, but probably 1777.
be the case, in theory, that Bentham argued for only small quantities of punishment to be needed to achieve a deterrent effect, in practice it was shown to be more complicated.
An important distinction is introduced with the claim that there is a significant difference in deterrent effect of a given lot of punishment when faced with various motives to offend. The poorer a man is, the nearer is the appetite for riches to the physical appetite of hunger: it is the more precipitate: it is the less qualified for the task of calculation. On this account it is necessary to be severer against crimes of indigence than against crimes of avarice although the nominal profit to the criminal and the mischief to the party injured be to the same amount in the one case as in the other.
It is clear that in
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The implications of this passage appear far-reaching. What is of interest here is the considerable emphasis placed on the principle that quantities of punishment restrain motives, rather than prevent specific offences. The countering of various motivating forces, on the economic model, was given new importance in this calculation of punishment. 58 But recognition was also given, for the first time, to the entirely inconsistent deterrent ability of a given quantity of punishment when faced with a 57 UC xxvii. 63. 58 This was a considerable distance from Beccaria's understanding, which suggested a fixed scale of punishment to offence and appeared unable substantially to accord with motivating circumstances in particular instances. Eden, on the other hand, did appreciate something of the variety of forms of motivation, since he called for the legislator to put himself in the situation of the offender, and to take account of the offender's circumstances before assigning punishment. Yet he could only offer vague, incalculable sympathy in response. 1. the quantity of pain inflicted on society by the offence 2. the quantity of profit received by the offender 3. the disposition of the offender It can be seen that his thirteen formal rules of proportion dealt essentially with the second aspect in that their prime object was to outweigh the profit of the offence at minimum expense; they also dealt with the first aspect by emphasising that every particle of mischief must receive a quantity of punishment. These thirteen rules did not, however, bear any relation to the third aspect, that of the disposition of the offender. Yet, his theory of proportion had also to incorporate increments of pain relative to the nature of the offender's disposition if this was found to be 'bad'. Here we find a conceptual separation between motivation, intention, disposition and the rules of proportion, with 'disposition', in particular, referring to a manner of reaction to motives.
The notion of disposition thus becomes closely linked to the idea of individual 'character'
and its goodness or badness as reflected in, and identified by, the response to the force of motives and their restraining sanctions. If 'disposition' was found to be other than positively 'bad' then this aspect would provide grounds for restraint in punishment.
It is suggested therefore, that it was emphasis on this element which prevented
Bentham's logical addition of quantities of punishment from uncontrollably undermining his interest in greater leniency, especially for the indigent poor.
The Role of 'Disposition' in the Reduction of Legal Punishment
As an integral part of Bentham's discussion of human dispositions he confronted the problem of how to assess the depravity of an offender, and how to account for this 'anti-social' aspect of character within his economic model. In the late eighteenthcentury debate this question of depravity revolved around, and was inextricably linked with, the question of how temptation should be dealt with in any theory of proportioned punishment.
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The problem of a reduction in blame when accompanied by an increase in temptation was a peculiarly English development. It was not prominent in Beccaria's discussion, yet William Blackstone, an important disciple of Beccaria in some respects, spent much time considering the question. And William Eden, once again, is seen to confront the problem of temptation in suggesting that the 'malignity' of an offence should be established before assigning punishment. 61 Eden's analysis has further been contrasted with the approaches of Blackstone and
William Paley, both of whom sought in varying ways to justify severe punishments, as they too drew conclusions of depravity from the susceptibility to temptation.
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However, both Blackstone and Paley argued that the category of offence took precedence over the motives of the offender, and over the consequences of his actions.
Hence the most tempting offences, that is to say, those which were most easily committed and most difficult to detect, ought to be assigned the severest punishments.
Eden's analysis was, conversely, exceptional in its valuation of the particular circumstances of individual offenders, and in its demand for a clear reduction in punishment in proportion to any increases in temptation, and there are clear connections to Bentham's thinking here.
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Bentham unmistakably engaged with this debate when he assumed 'disposition' to be associated with the question of temptation. 64 Incorporating this into his model he regarded a disposition to be either beneficent or depraved, and his position of the late 1770s was summed up in IPML as follows:
So far then as the absence of any aggravation, arising from extraordinary depravity of disposition, may operate, or at the utmost, so far as the presence of a ground of extenuation, resulting from the innocence or beneficence of the offender's disposition, can operate, the strength of the temptation may operate in abatement of the demand for punishment. But it can never operate so far as to indicate the propriety of making the punishment ineffectual, which it is sure to be when 61 Eden, Principles of Penal Law, p. 10. 62 Radzinowicz is one amongst many to have noted the variety of views on punishment in relation to an increased temptation to offend. English Criminal Law, p. 250 and p. 385. 63 Eden's argument was that tempting crimes showed less depravity, and consequently deserved less punishment. It was Eden's view -against the accepted understanding of the law as expressed by William Blackstone -that the application of Beccaria's theory of proportion in punishment could provide for no other conclusion. It was inherently unjust to punish more severely those who committed the simplest and most tempting crimes.
brought below the level of the apparent profit of the offence. 65 Here, Bentham clearly stated his rejection of Blackstone's and Paley's calls for automatic increases in punishment with increases in temptation; and in this sense
Bentham can be said to follow Eden's line of thinking, though with an economic justification attached to any reduction of punishment in relation to temptation.
Nevertheless, Bentham placed a strict limit on the extent to which temptation could be used to reduce punishment -it ought never to fall 'below the level of the apparent profit of the offence'. Here we see that although disposition must be taken into account, it was not of prime importance; it must follow a calculation of mischief spread, and a valuation of the profit of the offence. Nonetheless, a basis was provided for the reduction in punishment.
However, paradoxically, the above text, which supported the strength of temptation as a ground of abatement, apparently contradicted the analysis given just one sentence earlier:
The strength of the temptation, caeteris paribus, is as the profit of the offence: the quantum of the punishment must rise with the profit of the offence: caeteris paribus, it must therefore rise with the strength of the temptation. This there is no disputing.
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Clearly there is ample room for confusion. Bentham's position in regard to this issue has been closely discussed by both Elie Halévy and Leon Radzinowicz; but although they ultimately conclude that Bentham's theory does allow for some, limited extenuation of punishment upon certain occasions of increased temptation, they remain unconvinced that Bentham sought any substantial reduction on these grounds. To say that the proof of a depraved disposition is less conclusive is not to say that the depravity is less. For in spite of contrary indications it is always possible that the crime would have been committed even if the temptation had been less strong. The attenuating circumstance is only a matter of presumption; the crime is a matter of certainty.
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It seems Halévy is suggesting that it will be a rare occasion when an increase in temptation will actually lead to any attenuation of punishment. It does sometimes appear possible to doubt whether Bentham's theory will actually lead to any mitigation at all. In summing up the use of his chapter on human disposition, for instance, Bentham said:
The depravity of disposition, indicated by an act, is a material consideration in several respects. 74 Hart also finds Bentham's views on temptation to be apparently contradictory: 'For Bentham a strong temptation points in two opposite directions: on the one hand it shows that the offence manifests a less generally maleficent disposition needing less to correct it than the same offence committed for some trivial gain. So punishment may in principle be abated on this account. But it must never be lowered to the point at which it fails to outweigh the apparent profit; if it does the offender will be punished to no purpose and his punishment will be so much useless cruelty[. The question is not whether a penal code is more or less severe; this is a bad way of looking at the subject. The whole question can be reduced to judging whether or not the severity of the code is necessary.
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It is more appropriate to say, then, that Bentham did not agree with Eden in supporting lenient sentences simply because they were lenient, but that he did agree with Eden in regarding existing systems of punishments to be inhumane in their lack of proportion; consequently he sought to establish a far closer proportioning of punishment to 76 In his discussion of human dispositions Bentham concluded that: '[...] the aversion we find so frequently expressed against the maxim, that the punishment must rise with the strength of the temptation; a maxim, the contrary of which, as we shall see, would be as cruel to offenders themselves, as it would be subversive of the purposes of punishment'. IPML (CW), p. 142. 77 Ibid., pp. 167-8. 78 Ibid., p. 167. 79 'Rationale', Bowring, i. p. 398.
offence. 80 Ultimately then, Radzinowicz is mistaken in grouping Bentham together with Blackstone simply because they both mention that punishment ought to be greater for more tempting crimes. Bentham did not argue, as Blackstone and others did, that tempting crimes demanded greater punishments because they were easy to commit.
Neither did he say that the most tempting crimes should be severely punished because they were more difficult to prevent. His argument for all crimes was the same. They will only be prevented once the pain of punishment outweighed the profit of the offence. He took the view that neither too great nor too small a punishment was required, but only one correctly measured.
To move the debate beyond the analysis of Halévy and Radzinowicz it is necessary to return to the manuscripts. 81 Here Bentham expressed the desire that those of good disposition ought not to be punished more severely solely because they were exposed to temptation. In the sense that 'beneficence' might be seen as a characteristic of individual disposition, Bentham's use of the concept of 'good' disposition here appears very close to the conventional notion of individual virtue. 82 Indeed, where Eden spoke of virtue, Bentham suggested beneficial conduct. 83 Disposition is thus linked closely to intentionality. Yet still this was pursued in economic terms: if an individual's actions had no intention of harming society, or if they positively meant to benefit society, then, although harm might be unwittingly produced, the disposition had to be good or 'beneficent'. Although such actions could not be encouraged, at the very least they could be taken to show the absence of any future threat from the offender.
The Nature of Disposition as an Indicator of Future Mischief
This future threat was of key importance for Bentham's theory. To make sense of his analysis we must examine the model of the 'shapes of mischief' discussed in the chapter on the 'Consequences of a Mischievous Act' in IPML. 84 A man with a numerous family of children, on the point of starving, goes into a baker's shop, steals a loaf, divides it all among the children, reserving none of it for himself. It will be hard to infer that that man's disposition is a mischievous one upon the whole.
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In general it could be said that such a man would only give in to the temptation to steal when his family was on the point of starvation, and this was done in an extra- Alter the case, give him [the man with the family] but one child, and that hungry perhaps, but in no imminent danger of starving: and now let the man set fire to a house full of people, for the sake of stealing money out of it to buy the bread with. The disposition here indicated will hardly be looked upon as a good one. 87 Clearly, in this case, the temptation is in no way as extreme as the first, and the action taken is directly harmful to others in a considerable degree. The general threat from an individual prepared to take such action was considered to be high, and a correspondingly high threat of punishment was required to counter such an offence.
But it was also established that, as far as the particular behaviour of both offenders in the examples were concerned, they were extremely likely, perhaps even certain, to succumb to future temptations similar to the 'particular sort of case in question'. The crucial importance of this point was carried to a logical conclusion with the suggestion that 'as often as a temptation of the magnitude in question falls in his way, so often will he committ the offence in question'. Hence Bentham also claimed that:
If then it be seriously intended to find a stop to the offence in question it is evident that an addition must be made to the punishment; and that not in the inverse proportion to the strength of the temptation.
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Bentham continued, saying that to do otherwise would be cruelty to both the community and to the offender, thus, apparently neutralising once again his earlier argument that temptation recommended abatement of punishment.
This divided approach to the assessment of offences of strong temptation exemplifies the way Bentham's theory was able to tackle existing questions in a new fashion. But it also shows how the complexity introduced by such an appreciation of positive and negative social value necessarily removed the possibility of establishing any simple line of argument in respect of temptation. He could never provide a fixed rule which demanded either an increase or a reduction when faced with high temptation. Commentators have clearly had difficulty in reconciling the conflicting ideas Bentham presented on this point. Yet consistency is provided in both his manuscripts and published work.
On the one hand, from the 'general' perspective Bentham argued that society had little to fear from the individual who succumbed to an offence of high temptation.
On the other hand, from the 'particular' view, he was certain that society had a great deal to fear from the same offender. By dividing his analysis, and producing such a dual assessment of the future threat from offenders lured by high temptation, Bentham found grounds for supporting both a reduction and an increase in any corresponding punishment. This does not imply, however, that one cancels out the other, for the quantities involved always vary.
The problem for Bentham was that as long as there remained the chance of a similar temptation reoccurring, the political sanction had to take some action to prevent it. It was certainly not free to remit punishment altogether as he believed was the case as far as the moral sanction was concerned. 89 Again Bentham was in accord with William Eden, for even Eden never suggested that offences of high temptation ought to go unpunished altogether. With division into a 'general' and 'particular' threat, it seems plain that Bentham's theory was able to establish a considerably reduced threat from such offences. For, since the greater threat must come from 'general' behaviour, once this was detached from the specific 'particular' threat, it was indeed possible for Bentham to argue for the imposition of a lower quantity of pain as punishment. 90 The obvious problem for Halévy and Radzinowicz, in deciding which occasions were appropriate for mitigated punishment and which were not, is resolved. In Bentham's penal theory any mitigation on the basis of temptation depended solely on the establishment of an absence of any 'general' threat from the behaviour of the offender, and this rested, predominantly, on an identification of the 'disposition' of the offender as 'good or beneficent'.
Thus, individual disposition was assessed by Bentham in terms of its inclination to produce future pain within society, and therefore formed the last of the three key aspects in Bentham's theory of proportion. With his rules of proportion he provided a 89 See UC xxvii. 60, where a sharp contrast is drawn between the moral and political sanctions in cases of high temptation. 90 Ibid.
calculative model which sought restraint in punishment, and he attempted to provide a method, framed in economic language, for justifying the milder punishment of those driven to crime by circumstances where no positive indication of depravity was found. In this way Bentham established a means for valuing the popular, often sentimentally provoked, call for a reduction in severity of punishment for simple, tempting crimes, and developed a detailed analysis for the calculation of depravity.
Concluding Remarks
Becker was very much aware, in 1968, that an 'economic' approach to crime and punishment might prove distasteful to his readers, and he sought to calm any concerns provoked by the 'apparent novelty of an "economic" framework for illegal behaviour' by making clear that both Beccaria and Bentham had 'explicity applied an economic calculus' to these subjects some two hundred years earlier.
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This essay has attempted to illustrate how the intellectual heritage for an 'economic' perspective on crime and punishment is far richer than even Becker supposed, and that with Bentham's analysis it reached a new level of sophistication and development.
Economic assessments form the root of consequentialist thinking about all social policy and this discussion has sought to identify how comprehensive such thinking can be when focussed on a particular issue. Bentham developed a subtle and sophisticated method for the assessment and application of punishment in terms of benefits and burdens. He was perfectly aware that the precision demanded by such a theory could never be achieved in practice. Indeed, any theory which attempted to account for quantities of pain inflicted on a population at large, made up of 'unassignable', that is entirely unknown, individuals could never achieve total precision in quantification. Yet Bentham realised an assessment of such distributed pains had to be attempted if an effective system of deterrence was to be achieved by the imposition of legal punishment.
Becker's own analysis has certainly raised an awareness of the ideas of 
